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ASK THE
PROFESSOR—HOW
DID THE FIFTH
CIRCUIT INTERPRET
THE “INVESTOR
BENEFIT”
REQUIREMENT
GOVERNING
DISGORGEMENTS IN
BLACKBURN
By Professor Emeritus Ronald Filler
Ronald Filler is a Professor Emeritus
and the Chair of the Ronald H. Filler
Institute on Financial Services Law at
New York Law School. He has taught
courses on Derivatives Law, Securities
Regulation, the Regulation of BrokerDealers and FCMs and other financial
law issues since 1977 at four different
U.S. law schools. Prof. Filler is a Public
Director of the National Futures Association, a Public Director and
Member and Chair of the Regulatory
Oversight Committee of Swap-Ex, a
swap execution facility owned by the
State Street Corporation, and has served
on the boards of various exchanges,
clearing houses and industry trade
associations. Before joining the NYLS
faculty in 2008, he was a Managing
Director in the Capital Markets Prime
Services Division at Lehman Brothers
Inc. in its New York headquarters. Prof.
Filler has co-authored, with Prof. Jerry
Markham, “Regulation of Derivative
Financial Instruments (Swaps, Options
and Futures).” He provides expert witness testimony and consulting services

relating to a variety of issues involving
the financial services industry. You can
reach Prof. Filler via email at:
ronald.filler@nyls.edu.

INTRODUCTION
In Kokesh v. SEC,1 the U.S. Supreme
Court held that a disgorgement action
brought by the SEC was indeed a penalty
under 28 U.S.C.A. § 2462. Section 2462
states:
“[e]xcept as otherwise provided by Act
of Congress, an action, suit or proceeding for the enforcement of any civil fine,
penalty, or forfeiture, pecuniary or otherwise, shall not be entertained unless commenced within five years from the date
when the claim first accrued. . . .”2

The principal issue before the Supreme
Court in Kokesh was whether an action for
disgorgement brought by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission in an enforcement action was subject to this fiveyear statute of limitation (now amended
to, in many cases, extend to 10 years3) or
whether it constituted an equitable remedy and therefore was not a “fine, penalty
or forfeiture” subject to the five-year
limitation period.4 While the Kokesh case
primarily focused on this five-year limitation period, the Supreme Court also held
that “a ‘penalty’ is a ‘punishment,’
whether corporal or pecuniary, imposed
and enforced by the State, for a crime or
offen[s]e against its laws.”5 Therefore, to
analyze whether disgorgement is in fact a
penalty, two main principles apply.
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First, whether a sanction represents a penalty
turns in part on “whether the wrong sought to be
redressed is a wrong to the public or a wrong to
the individual. . . .” Second, a pecuniary sanction
operates as a penalty only if it is sought “for the
purpose of punishment, and to deter others from
offending in like manner—as opposed to compensating a victim for his loss.”6

two-part test, namely that the disgorged amount
in a securities case: (1) does not exceed the
defendant’s “net profits,” and (2) is awarded for
the “benefit” of the victims of the defendant’s
misconduct. On the first item, Justice Sonia
Sotomayor wrote that “Courts may not enter
disgorgement awards that exceed the gains”
made after accounting for expenses.10

Applying these principles, the Court then held:

But what constitutes an award for the “benefit”
of the victims of misconduct? Justice Sotomayor
provided some guidance, noting that “the SEC’s
equitable, profits-based remedy must do more
than simply benefit the public at large by virtue
of depriving a wrongdoer of ill-gotten gains.”11
However, it is the Fifth Circuit Blackburn case
where, for the first time, a U.S. Court of Appeals
has provided more guidance as to what constitutes the “award for victims” question addressed
in Liu.12

First, SEC disgorgement is imposed by the courts
as a consequence for violating what we [have]
described . . . as public laws. The violation for
which the remedy is sought is committed against
the United States rather than an aggrieved individual—that is why, for example, a securities
enforcement action may proceed even if victims
do not support or are not parties to the
prosecution. As the Government concedes,
“[w]hen the SEC seeks disgorgement, it acts in
the public interest, to remedy harm to the public
at large, rather than standing in the shoes of particular injured parties. . . . Second, SEC disgorgement is imposed for punitive purposes. . . .
The primary purpose of disgorgement is to deter
violations of the securities laws by depriving
violators of their ill-gotten gains.”7

The Court concluded that:
SEC disgorgement thus bears all of the hallmarks
of a penalty. It is imposed as a consequence of
violating a public law and it is intended to deter,
not to compensate. The 5-year statute of limitations in § 2462 therefore applies when the SEC
seeks disgorgement.8

THE LIU CASE
Three years later, the Supreme Court in SEC v.
Liu decided that the SEC may continue to obtain
disgorgements in federal court.9 The Court in Liu
held, however, that, to be effective, disgorgements in a SEC enforcement case must meet a
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ANALYSIS OF THE BLACKBURN
CASE
Ronald Blackburn founded Treaty Energy
Corporation in 2008. Treaty was a small oil and
gas company, the shares of which were traded
over the counter as “penny stocks.” Although
never listed as an officer or director of Treaty,
Blackburn owned approximately 86% of Treaty’s
shares and thus he was deemed to be in control of
Treaty. Blackburn had been previously convicted
of four federal tax felonies. The SEC brought an
enforcement action against Blackburn and other
officers of Treaty and alleged, among other
things: (1) the defendants failed to register millions of Treaty shares in violation of Section 5 of
the Securities Act of 1933, (2) Blackburn and another defendant misrepresented the company’s
drilling results to investors, and (3) two of the
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other defendants deceived investors about Blackburn’s role in Treaty directly and through the
Form 10-K filed with the SEC.

The Fifth Circuit then held that the district
court’s order clearly satisfied the two tests noted
in Liu. It stated:

Both the SEC and the individual defendants
filed a motion for summary judgment. The district
court denied the motion filed by the defendants
but granted the motion filed by the SEC. The
district court judge concluded that the defendants
violated Section 5 of the 1933 Act, that they
violated Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 and SEC Rule 10b-5 thereunder, and
violated Section 17(a) of the 1933 Act by misrepresenting Treaty’s oil production and Blackburn’s
role in Treaty. The district court imposed several
nonmonetary remedies, including prohibiting the
defendants from acting as officers or directors of
any publicly-held company but also ordered
“disgorgement” of profits and imposed civil

First, the disgorgement amounts are the profits
defendants received from their securities fraud:
$1,512,059.96 for Blackburn, $108,291.05 for
Mulshine and $772,434.90 for Gwyn. As those
figures show, the district court did not impose
joint-and-several liability but individually addressed each defendant’s gain.

monetary penalties.13

THE FIFTH CIRCUIT OPINION
The Fifth Circuit accepted the findings of the
district court judge and affirmed the lower court’s
order to grant the motion for summary judgment
requested by the SEC. It then focused on the
“disgorgement” remedy granted by the district
court. It noted first that the 1934 Act authorizes
the SEC to seek “equitable relief” that may be
appropriate or necessary for “the benefit of
investors.” 14 In citing Liu, the Fifth Circuit
acknowledged that “equity practices long authorized courts to strip wrongdoers of their ill-gotten
gains.”15 To allow any such disgorgement, the equitable relief cannot be punitive and thus “cannot
exceed the defendants’ ‘net profits’ and must be
‘awarded for [the] victims.’ ”16
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Second, the district court concluded that the SEC
had identified the victims and created a process
for the return of disgorged funds. Under the
district court’s supervision, any funds recovered
will go to the SEC, acting as a de facto trustee.
The SEC will then disburse those funds to victims
but only after district court approval.17

The Fifth Circuit added that while the district
court’s order “requiring disbursements to
already-identified victims with court supervision
to ensure compliance with that edict” was clearly
in accord with Liu, it is not “the only way to
satisfy Liu as . . . [other] cases may present
greater challenges for ensuring that disgorgement
benefits victims.”18
In its brief filed before the Fifth Circuit, the
SEC emphasized the Liu test and the traditional
role of equity courts in awarding recovery for
unjust enrichment:
Section 21(d)(5) authorizes the Commission to
seek, and courts to award, “equitable relief that
may be appropriate or necessary for the benefit
of investors.” Liu held that Section 21(d)(5)
authorizes “a disgorgement award that does not
exceed a wrongdoer’s net profits and is awarded
for victims’, and that such recovery of unjust
enrichment is a “mainstay of equity courts.”19

The SEC additionally sought to reserve the
ability in some cases to award disgorgement
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funds to the Department of the Treasury instead
of to victims, asserting that:
The Supreme Court further stated that the “equitable nature of the profits remedy generally
requires the SEC to return a defendant’s gains to
wronged investors for their benefit.” The Court
left “open” whether “depositing disgorgement
funds with the Treasury may be justified where it
is infeasible to distribute the collected funds to
investors.”20

CONCLUSION
During the Blackburn litigation, the district
court initially ruled that the disgorged amounts
were to be distributed to the SEC and then placed
in the U.S. Treasury. The defendants appealed
that initial lower court decision and, before the
Fifth Circuit could rule on this, the Supreme
Court issued the Liu decision. In accord with Liu,
it was remanded back to the district court to
modify the initial disgorgement order. The district
court then ordered that the disgorged amount
would, as noted above, be paid to the SEC as the
“de-facto trustee” but that any actual disgorgement plan would need court approval.
In Blackburn, the lower court’s model clearly
establishes a method that allowed the SEC to
make disgorgements consistent with Liu and,
therefore, with low risk of being successfully
challenged. This practical, fact-specific model
should easily be upheld in future cases. The question becomes what other disgorgement models
will be accepted in lieu of Liu? Can a lower court
approve, as did the initial lower court decision,
merely placing the disgorged amounts in the U.S.
Treasury? Will the “benefit to investors” test be
upheld by the courts if the SEC can identify only
some, but not all, of the shareholders? Finally,
with the express authorization of the SEC’s abil-
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ity to seek disgorgement in the National Defense
Act of 2021, how will future courts interpret this
more-robust statutory authority differently than
the Court in Liu?21
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